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Abstract: Land-use patterns are oen the result of feedback eﬀects in which
one agent’s decision both inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by urban form. is
paper argues that such feedback—of a positive or negative kind—could plau-
sibly arise in the provision of oﬀ-street parking. A stylized model is used to
illustrate feedback in the case of bundled parking, to note how such feedback
may change a neighborhood in the long run and to analyze several policies.
A theme is that feedback opens the door to surprising eﬀects that are hard to
predict from the status quo.
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1 Introduction
Oﬀ-street parking is among themost heavily regulated features of the built environment. In particular,
parking minimums—rules requiring developers of new buildings to supply oﬀ-street parking in some
proportion to the amount of built structure—have been nearly ubiquitous in the United States for
decades (Ferguson 2004; Jakle and Sculle 2004). But the tide may be turning, and a drive to relax
parking minimums is gaining traction. is trend invites questions about how cities would change if
today’s rules were liberalized or—as proposed in Barter (2010)—replaced by a new regime.¹ A robust
and growing literature on parking seeks to provide answers and bring clarity to these questions.
Part of the parking literature is concerned with the actions of individual developers and landown-
ers. Would they really supply much less parking if permitted? Li and Guo (2014) use as a natural
experiment a campaign of parking reform—both the elimination of minimums and, in some places,
the imposition of maximums—carried out in London during the early 2000s. Comparing nearby de-
velopments before-and-aer, the authors estimate reforms reducedoﬀ-street parking by0.76 spaces per
unit, or 49 percent, and that eliminating minimums was more important than imposing maximums.
Similarly, Manville (2013) looks at Los Angeles projects that take advantage of an ordinance change
for the reuse of historic buildings, and ﬁnd developers include less parking when allowed. McDonnell
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that 18 of 38 residential projects surveyed inueens provided exactly the minimum
number of parking spaces, which would be a coincidence were mandates not the limiting factor. Tak-
ing a more economic approach, Cutter and Franco (2012) ask whether the marginal parking space
adds more value to the structure with which it comes bundled than it costs to provide. For six prop-
erty types in suburban Los Angeles, the marginal space does not appear to pull its weight, suggesting
it exists for compliance.
¹ For a more thorough discussion of the economics of parking, see Inci (2014).
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ere is also strand of thought in the parking literature that takes whatmight be called the “neigh-
borhood perspective.” A theme is that, paved surfaces being neither origins (such as homes) nor desti-
nations (such as shops, cafes, bars, groceries, oﬃces, social facilities) unto themselves, oﬀ-street parking
takes space from the enlivening land uses that make a place walkable. ere is a competition between
parking and ﬂoorspace. Weinberger et al. (2010) argues that, due to parkingminimums, “ewalking
environment is undermined and the distance between destinations increases.” Mukhija and Shoup
(2006) agree: “Parking lots and garages tend to interrupt the streetscape, expand the distances be-
tween destinations, and undermine walkability.” Taken far enough, parking minimums become what
Willson (1995) calls “tacit policy for automobile use and urban sprawl.” On the other hand, implicit
in the rules themselves is another argument from the neighborhood perspective: without abundant
oﬀ-street parking, vehicles will crowd the streets and overﬂow among neighbors’ private lots.
is paper aims to theoretically link the two perspectives for a particular urban environment. Un-
der consideration are city neighborhoods meeting two criteria: First, the amount of oﬀ-street parking
can feasibly aﬀect the neighborhood’s walkability and crowding. Excluded, then, are places where land
is so lightly developed that parking does notmeaningfully limit density, andwhere on-street parking is
plentiful for any level of oﬀ-street parking. Second, the neighborhood is subject to sequential land-use
change in which lots are developed or redeveloped on occasion. When the time is right, a property-
owner or developer may rebuild a dilapidated house, construct new apartments on an under-used lot
or undertake a small ﬁnesee, such as turning a garage into an in-law unit. Both student neighborhoods
and the older, residential areas of American cities are oen good examples of the sort of area we have
in mind.
For a neighborhood of this kind, the paper explores the idea that there may plausibly arise a “feed-
back loop” between individual decisions and neighborhood outcomes. is feedback loop is a rela-
tionship of mutual inﬂuence: e individual developer’s choice of how much oﬀ-street parking to
supply inﬂuences neighborhood characteristics, which, in turn, inﬂuence that choice. Other features
of urban life and land-use are rich in such chicken-and-egg links between gestalt properties and indi-
vidual choices. An entrepeneur opens the tenth bar in a popular nightlife district because the crowds
are there, and people go there for a night out precisely because there is such a variety of bars. It may be
proﬁtable for planners to consider feedback with respect to the parking supply, too.
One reason to look at feedback in parking is to enrich the conceptual vocabulary bywhich parking
is understood. Urbanneighborhoods can evidently functionwithwidely diﬀerentparking intensities—
from relative parking deserts in Philadelphia and Boston to lands of milk and honey in Las Vegas and
Phoenix. An appreciation of feedback invites interesting questions about this state of aﬀairs. With
parking minimums liberalized, is it possible that a parking-abundant, mildly-walkable neighborhood
could, over the course of decades, becomemore like a parking-scarce, highly-walkableneighborhood—
that a neighborhood in, say, Atlanta could become a little more like one in, say, Pittsburgh?
A second reason is to recognize that policy results can be hard to predict from even a thorough
study of the status quo. Suppose, for instance, that a planner surveys recent projects in a neighborhood
and learns that developers would have rather built only about half the spaces required by law. It is
tempting to deduce that, if the law were abolished, new projects would in fact turn out to have about
half asmany spaces. Butwhile today’s developersmaybuild projectswith only half asmany spaces, once
enough of themdo so theywill have collectively somewhat changed the neighborhood character, made
it denser. Consequently, future developers may want to supply either more spaces or fewer. Perhaps
developers will come to see parking as an underserved niche they can enter proﬁtably. On the other
hand, perhaps they will decide the neighborhood is becoming the sort of walkable place where people
can make do with considerably less parking. ese later decisions, in turn, will “feed back,” shaping
still later ones.
e paper explores the above logic in the following way: First, Section 2 discusses qualitatively
the idea of a feedback loop in parking provision—what mechanisms might drive it and to what ef-
fect. Next, borrowing an approach from economics, Section 3 proposes a particular, stylized model
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in which feedback arises. e model is used to illustrate the path of the neighborhood under positive
and negative feedback, the concept of equilibrium and implications for policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 The concept of feedback
e concept of a feedback loop has wide purchase across physical and social sciences. In engineering,
it describes a system whose output is also one of its inputs—e.g., when the microphone picks up the
sound of the speaker to which it is connected. Here, the feedback loop describes a relationship of
causation between two quantities: (i) the amount of parking in a neighborhood; (ii) the amount of
parking that individual property-owners or developers (hereaer referred to as “landlords”) wish to
provide upon redevelopment. One direction of causation is arithmetically true: how much parking
individuals decide to provide aﬀects the aggregate parking supply. e other direction of causation
hinges on a question: how does the neighborhood inﬂuence the individual? Depending on the nature
of that inﬂuence, feedback can be of either a “positive” or “negative” character.
2.1 Positive feedback
Positive feedback in general describes a process that is self-reinforcing—such as the example of amicro-
phone cited above. It has long been of use to social scientists in explaining themultiple equilibria, path
dependence, tipping points and other interesting phenomena observed in real societies—particularly
the remarkable complexity and discontinuity of human geography. Widely-cited examples include
racial segregation (Schelling 1971), educational segregation (Benabou 1993), diﬀerences in the fre-
quency of riots among places (Granovetter 1978), and manufacturing belts (Krugman 1990).
Positive feedback here means a rise in the neighborhood’s parking supply makes the individual
landlord want to providemore parking. e converse holds, too: the scarcer parking becomes, the less
the landlord wants to supply. Why should this happen? Setting aside for now facts about crowding
and a market for parking, the force driving positive feedback could be the same one that has invited
concerns about a surfeit of parking: its eﬀect on walkability, on the pedestrian vibrancy of the place.
It is hard to saywith any precision howmuch land in cities is devoted to parking, and even statistics
widely quoted may be unreliable (Manville and Shoup 2005). Looking at several studies of diﬀerent
cities, McCahill and Garrick (2014) report estimates that between 10 and 40 percent of CBD land is
parking. In any case, parking clearly consumes much land that could be otherwise devoted to origins
or destinations. us, its prominence in the landscape constrains the count of destinations reachable
from an origin by a reasonably short trip on foot or by bike. And by the same token, the aggregate
amount of land devoted to parking also constrains the number of customers who can be pedestrian
patrons of a destination.
ere are several ways that walkability could reasonably cause a landlord to devote less space to
parking and more to another use. Perhaps ﬂoorspace rents and parking rents rise as walkability in-
creases, but ﬂoorspace does so more quickly. Or, per the Cutter and Franco (2012) model in which
parking enhances the ﬂoorspace with which it comes bundled, parking might not “pull its weight” as
much in a walkable area; it might not add enough value relative to its cost and the ﬂoorspace it dis-
places. Lastly, on land that is owner-occupied, a rise in walkability might lead the owner to dowithout
the third car and build an extension over part of the driveway. And even when current owners do not
plan these alterations, buyers who do wish to make them will raise their bids as walkability rises.
Note the diﬀerence between the sort of positive feedback advanced here and another, more “top-
down” conception. Jacobs (1961, p. 350) explicitly cites positive feedback to explain the “erosion of
cities” by automobile space—including parking. e principals in Jacobs’ story are bureaucrats and
civic leaders who endlessly convert land from other uses to parking and streets. Positive feedback de-
scribes the ironic way their interventions frequently wind up making traﬃc worse, leading the inter-
ventions to be iterated. Similar theories of positive feedback at the government level—though not
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necessarily stated in the language of feedback—appear in Shoup (2005, Ch. 5). e question here,
by contrast, is what happens if the government strengthens or weakens a certain policy and lets things
evolve, not what happens if the government keeps ramping up or down the policy. Change occurs
as a side-eﬀect of uncoordinated private action. e actors are landlords uninterested in, and likely
ignorant of, what their own parking does to urban form.
2.2 Negative feedback
Negative feedback generally describes a process that is self-stabilizing, wherein a deviation in the out-
put tends to undermine itself. An example is the body’s temperature control system: when temperature
deviates from the body’s target level, the body takes note and either sweats or shivers to return to the
target. Negative feedback here means a rise in the parking supply discourages the individual landlord
from providing parking, whereas a fall inclines the landlord to provide more.
An obvious mechanism for negative feedback is supply-and-demand in a place where parking is
traded as a priced commodity: a boost in supply sinks parking rents, muting the incentive to add
parking; and a scarcity of parking in a dense neighborhood will raise the price of parking, making
it proﬁtable to provide. Where parking comes bundled with ﬂoorspace, negative feedback can still
plausibly arise via crowding: on-street parking becomes harder to ﬁnd when the neighborhood lacks
oﬀ-street parking, because people park on the streetmore oen. Reasonably, this crowdingmeans that
the marginal parking spot adds more value to the bundled ﬂoorspace than when an on-street space is
always ripe for the taking nearby. us, crowdingmakes proﬁtable a higher ratio of parking to rentable
ﬂoorspace.
3 Economic model
Above, Krugman (1990) was mentioned as a famous application of positive feedback concepts in ge-
ography. It is a purely theoretical study. Decribing its goals, Krugman (2011) says he set out to create,
“a model that was not intended to be realistic, indeed was aggressively unrealistic, but would serve as
a demonstration.” is section, similarly, works through a highly stylized model of parking provision.
While this tack is unusual for the planning literature, it has advantages that compensate for strong
assumptions. e model serves as an example—like the frictionless surface of introductory physics—
that is easy to work with. It permits a graphical analysis in which certain qualitative ideas—such as
equilibrium, change and whether requirements bind—can be spoken of concretely and memorably.
And to the degree the model is unrealistic, it is at least plainly so.
Section 3.1 establishes the basic assumptions of the model and shows how landlords decide how
much on-street parking to provide. It is a Cutter and Franco (2012) situation in which parking adds
value to bundled ﬂoorspace. e bundled case is chosen because it is more interesting than the simple
mechanics of supply-and-demand, and because so much parking is bundled. Weinberger et al. (2010)
reports that developers have even tried to evade a San Francisco initiative that requires unbundled
parking, by oﬀering special pricing to owners of associated units. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 model assump-
tions about demand that lead to positive and negative feedback, respectively. In Sec. 3.4, we discuss
how equilibria and long-term change happen in the model’s context. Lastly, Sec. 3.5 looks at several
policies.
Note that a real neighborhood can and likely will have both forces of positive and negative feed-
back at the same time. We treat the all-or-nothing situations only for clarity of exposition.
3.1 Basic assumptions
Privately-owned land is divided into small parcels owned by landlords who are also, potentially, devel-
opers. It is assumed that all structures are stories tall, that landlords provide only what yardspace is
mandated by setback rules and that parking is at ground level beside the structure. See Figure 1 for a
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diagram of a parcel, in which the trees are setbacks. Consequently, the developable area of the neigh-
borhood is split between oﬀ-street parking and structures, and for the neighborhood to gain x sq. .
of parking it must losex sq. . of ﬂoorspace. Let the parking ratio, p , be the ratio of parking space to
ﬂoorspace on an individual parcel. It follows that 1=(1+ p) is the fraction of a parcel’s developable
land devoted to structure, while p=(1+ p) is the parking fraction. Let p¯ stand for p ’s aggregate
equivalent: the ratio of parking to ﬂoorspace for the whole neighborhood.
Figure 1: division of a parcel
e “rent” per unit area of ﬂoorspace is R. is is not a literal rent; it is the amortized return
aer costs.² e rent depends partly on p , the parking ratio of a single parcel. Parking cannot be
practically rented or sold as a commodity; rather, it comes bundled with ﬂoorspace for use by the
parcel’s occupants. e job of parking is to boost the rent of ﬂoorspace, and it is assumed to do so with
diminishing marginal returns. us, we can write rent as a function R(p), whose derivatives have the
signs @ R=@ p > 0 and @ 2R=@ p2 < 0.
Landlords choose p to maximize proﬁt. Since only ﬂoorspace earns money, and the amount of
ﬂoorspace per unit area of land is=(1+ p), it follows that proﬁt,, per unit area of land, is
(p) 
1+ p
R(p). (1)
is expression shows the landlord’s fundamental trade-oﬀ when parking is bundled: adding park-
ing (raising p) boosts the rent but at the cost of losing ﬂoorspace, which appears as an increase in
the denominator. e derivatives of R(p) give (p) the hump shape in Fig. 2. ere is a unique,
proﬁt-maximizing parking ratio, p. As p grows ever larger, proﬁt falls oﬀ to zero because there is no
ﬂoorspace to rent out at all. In Fig. 2, the peak occurs at a non-zero p, but it is also possible that it is
optimal to provide no parking at all.
In addition, the rent of ﬂoorspace depends—directly or indirectly—upon the neighborhood park-
ing ratio p¯ . Depending on how it does so, a change in p¯ may change the proﬁt-maximizing parking
ratio, p, that the landlord would like to have. Graphically, this means that a change in p¯ shis the
peak of(p) to the right or le. If we calculate the optimal parking ratio, p, for each aggregate ratio,
p¯ , we wind up with a best-response function p( p¯). e best-response function tells what parking ratio
a landlord would like, given the aggregate ratio is p¯ . When there is positive feedback, p( p¯) rises with
p ; the peak of(p) shis rightward as p¯ increases. When there is negative feedback, p( p¯) falls with
p ; the peak of(p) shis leward as p¯ increases.
² Since only returns—the margin of income over costs—matter to the developer’s decision, treating real rents and costs
would add complication without obtaining diﬀerent results.
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Figure 2: proﬁt function(p)
3.2 Positive feedback assumptions
e story we will tell to obtain positive feedback is that, when a neighborhood is dense in destina-
tions, rents become high enough—per unit area of ﬂoorspace though not necessarily per apartment or
shop—that a lower parking ratio is optimal. Closing the loop is the fact that, when the neighborhood
gains ﬂoorspace, it gains occupants who can ﬁnancially support a richer ecosystem of destinations.
Suppose the countofwalkable destinations in theneighborhood,w , riseswith aggregateﬂoorspace
in the following way: for every unit of ﬂoorspace beyond a minimum area , the neighborhood gains
one destination. It is assumed that the destinations themselves—at least the ones who are drawn in by
more occupants—do not consume a very signiﬁcant fraction of the neighborhood’s area. LetAbe the
area of developable land of the neighborhood, such thatA1+ p¯ is the aggregate supply of ﬂoorspace.
We may write a function
w( p¯)max
¨
0,
A
1+ p¯
 
«
, (2)
where themax operator precludes negative destinations.
Next, suppose rent is given by the function
R(p,w) R0 
1+ exp
 w2
1+p
. (3)
is function has been chosen to obtain illustrative results but is not especially meaningful in its own
right. R0 is a positive constant that can be thought of as a sort of “base rent.” e second term rises
in a diminishing way with p (so that tenants value parking), and it rises with w (so that tenants value
access to destinations). To ﬁnd the best-response function, we plug R(p,w( p¯)) into (1) and seek the
proﬁt-maximizing p for every p¯ . For the right values of A, R0,  and , p
( p¯) is S-shaped. Such
a curve appears in Figure 3 alongside the 45 line p = p¯ . Positive feedback is manifest in p( p¯)’s
positive slope.
3.3 Negative feedback assumptions
estorywewill tell to obtain negative feedback is that on-street and oﬀ-street parking are substitutes,
and that, as p¯ declines (as the neighborhood becomes denser in ﬂoorspace and scarcer in parking),
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Figure 3: best-response curve with positive feedback;
R0 = 1.8, = 2,A= 4.7,= 1
Figure 4: best-response curve with negative feedback
ﬁnding on-street parking involves more cruising and a longer walk. is crowding causes the rent to
rise and fall with p¯ . Speciﬁcally, let rent be given by
R(p, p¯) p1=2+ p¯1=2. (4)
Each term captures the positive, but marginally diminishing, value of on-street and oﬀ-street parking.
Figure 4 shows the best-response function p( p¯) derived from (4), again when  = 1. Negative
feeback is manifest in the negative slope of p( p¯).
3.4 Change
Since a neighborhood’s characteristics arise from the sum of individual decisions, redevelopment op-
portunities lead to the possibility of neighborhood-level change. An advantage of our formal model
is clarity about how this change may occur. ree ideas are discussed: (i) how to predict the direction
of change, (ii) equilibrium and (iii) stability.
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e process of change, of course, is liable to happen very slowly and possibly be subject to ﬁts and
starts. Buildings are very long-lived assets; they cannot be tailored in real-time to always ﬁtwhatwould
be optimal to build today if the landlord were starting from scratch. But by the varied types of rede-
velopment we have proposed, it is possible to speak of general directions of change—densiﬁcation,
clearing out—without pretending that parking supply wavers like the stock of orange pulp in a ware-
house.
3.4.1 The direction of change
To understand the direction of change, consider Figures 3 and 4 again. Whenever the line of the best-
response function is below the 45 line p = p¯ , it is true that p( p¯)< p¯ , which means the individual
landlord chooses a below-average ratio. Granted that this is permitted, the redeveloping landlord will
do so. And, just as the average height of a team falls when a shorter-than-average player joins, when
one landlord chooses a less-than-average parking ratio, the aggregate ratio falls slightly. erefore, if the
neighborhood is ever found tohave a p¯ where p( p¯)< p¯ , then the on-going process of redevelopment
will slowly bleed the parking supply. And when p( p¯) > p¯ , the neighborhood will take on parking,
because landlords choose an above-average ratio.
A lesson is that whether the neighborhood gains or loses parking is not a matter of having “too
much” or “too little” parking, relative to similarly-situated neighborhoods or to what intuition would
suggest. Whether the neighborhood is liable to gain or lose parking depends on the forces at play for
the particular parking ratio at which the neighborhood ﬁnds itself. Consider the neighborhood of Fig.
3, the positive feedback case. If the neighborhood has a ratio between p¯L and p¯M , then some parking
will disappear every few years. But if it has evenmore parking than this, if it has a p¯ between p¯M and
p¯H , then new parking will spring up. us, between these two intervals, adding to the parking supply
raises the demand for parking.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is said to arise when no landlord wants to change her parking ratio. is may happen
in the model under two circumstances: First, nearly every landlord has nearly the same parking ratio,
inwhich case p  p¯ for every landlord. Second, the universal parking ratio is a value atwhich atwhich
p( p¯) = p¯ . At ratios satisfying this condition, redevelopment does not change the aggregate.
Graphically, equilibrium parking ratios can be identiﬁed in our plots as the locations of intersec-
tion between the best-response curve and the 45 line. ere are three in the positive feedback case of
Fig. 3: pL, pM and pH . ere is only one, p¯e , in the negative feedback case of Fig. 4. Purely negative
feedback can only allow one equilibrium, because, if the best-response curve always falls, then once it
crosses the 45 line it can never rise to cross again. Positive feedback enables inﬁnitely many crossings,
depending on how the best-response curve wiggles as it rises, though the particular case presented here
involves just three.
3.4.3 Stability
While there may be many equilibria, only those that can survive a very slight deviation—such as a few
landlords not exactly following the rules of our model—are called “stable.” Stable equilibria in our
examples are p¯L and p¯H , from the positive feedback case, and p¯e , from the negative one. ese are
cases where the best-response function crosses the 45 line from above, where p( p¯) exceeds p¯ to the
le of the intersection and drops below p¯ to the right. is sort of crossingmeans that, if the aggregate
ratio p¯ is slightly higher than p¯H , p¯e or p¯L, then the neighborhood will lose parking and drop down
to the equilibrium ratio; and if the aggregate ratio is slightly lower, then the neighborhood will gain
parking and rise up to the equilibrium ratio.
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Equilibria that unravel easily are called “unstable.” emiddle ratio p¯M is unstable. If p¯ winds up
slightly higher than p¯M , then landlords will begin to choose greater-than-average parking ratios, and
they continue to do so as long as p( p¯) > p¯ . Change will continue until the stable equilibrium p¯H .
Conversely, if p¯ deviates just le of p¯M (where p
( p¯)< p¯), landlords will provide a less-than-average
amount until the neighborhood levels out at p¯L.
In reality, no neighborhood will sit in a stable or unstable equilibrium, however conceived, for
very long. Tastes, costs and larger market forces are in constant ﬂux, and their irregular tides mean,
for our model, constant shis in the R and p curves. Nonetheless, the concept of stability can be a
useful ideal. A stable equilibrium, even one in motion, suggests what direction the neighborhood is
likely to move even if it never quite stops. And the possibility of multiple stable equilibria highlights
to the importance of history-dependence—that the neighborhood is only in its current state because
it was there yesterday, not because the status quo is the only way things could have practically turned
out without planning.
3.5 Policies
So far, Sec. 3 has set up a neighborhood and asked how it might be expected to change and to stop
changing in the absence of policy. Fortunately, the model can usefully adapted to the formal analysis
of policy, and doing so yields several insights. Below, three policies will be examined: (i) parking
requirements, (ii) parking taxes and (iii) direct coordination. Somewhat more space is devoted to the
eﬀects of policies in the positive feedback case. e reason is that results of positive feedback are more
nuanced, not necessarily more realistic.
3.5.1 Parking requirements
While parking minimums are most common, some places—such as San Francisco and Manhattan—
have maximums. ese requirements can be treated as either ﬂoors or caps on the value of p that a
landlord is allowed to choose. Real parking requirements in many cases are written exactly so, as a
number of spaces that must be provided per 1000 sq. . of ﬂoorspace.
As iswell known, just because there exists a requirement does not necessarilymean it has anymean-
ingful eﬀect on land-use. Requirements only bind—that is, the landlord only wishes to do something
diﬀerently than he or she is allowed to—in certain cases. Aminimumbindswhen landlordswould like
to supply less parking than allowed; a maximum, when they would like to supply more. Evidence of
minimum parking requirements binding was mentioned in the introduction. e parking maximum
in Manhattan must be binding for certain landlords, because they have organized to have it relaxed
(Manville et al. 2013, p. 363).
Parking requirements are nested graphically in Fig. 5. A minimum pmin can bind if it falls where
p( p¯) is below the 45 line p = p¯ . In this case, if every parcel has a parking ratio near the minimum
(so that p¯  pmin), then landlords will want smaller ratios than pmin. Similarly, a maximum pmax can
bind when p( p¯) exceeds p = p¯ .
is way of looking at mandates has twomain lessons. First, in order for a requirement to actively
bind, the neighborhoodmust somehow reach the pointwhere individual landlordswish to break it. In
Figure 5(b), pmin is potentially binding, but if the neighborhood has settled in at the equilibrium p¯H
then landlords will gladly supplymuchmore than pmin. is is possible not only for thismodel but for
any situation where there aremultiple equilibria. Whatmight be called a requirement’s “bindingness,”
then, is not an essential feature of the requirement itself; it has power only in a speciﬁc history of a
particular location.
Second, the long-run eﬀect of a requirement may be substantially stronger or weaker than what
the individual landlord’s current point-of-view would suggest. e span g on Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
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[negative feedback]
[positive feedback]
Figure 5:minimum parking requirements
measures the gap between p(pmin) and pmin: how much parking a landlord provides to meet the
minimum when the neighborhood has settled at the minimum. In 5(a), landlords would rather sup-
ply much less parking (large g ). But were theminimum abolished, the neighborhood would converge
not to p(pmin) but to p¯e , which is much nearer to pmin than is p(pmin). us, the long-run ef-
fect with negative feedback is weaker than g in the status quo. Some of the parking that one landlord
decides not to provide will be provided by a diﬀerent landlord. e long-run eﬀect with positive feed-
back, on the other hand, may be much stronger than g . Figure 5(b) shows that, if the minimum were
abolished, the conversion of parking to ﬂoorspace would compound until the neighborhood reached
p¯L. As an example, suppose that, aer the parking minimum in some neighborhood is weakened,
some developers construct apartment complexes with many residents and little parking, and that the
extra population draws a major grocery store. Once the grocery store is in place, future developers
will be even less inclined to waste ﬂoorspace on parking, because rents will have risen somewhat, and
customers with fewer cars will more oen take an interest in the apartments.
3.5.2 Parking tax
A tax on parking area is advocated in Feitelson and Rotem (2004) as a means of internalizing driving
externalities and the heat absorption and polluting runoﬀ of parking surface. To include a tax in our
models, let  be the amount of the tax. Since the tax applies per unit area of parking, the developer
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Figure 6: eﬀect of parking tax on best-response
pays a tax on the parking fraction,p=(1+p) of the parcel. erefore, proﬁt is
= R  
1+p
   p
1+p
. (5)
e best-response function p( p¯) is then found in the usual way: by ﬁnding the proﬁt-maximizing
level of p for every p¯ .
For bothR above, the tax shrinks p, which is probably unsurprising. More noteworthy is the fact
that, with multiple stable equilibria, the size of the eﬀect of the tax may jump when the tax rises only
slightly. ere can be a “threshold eﬀect” or a “tipping point.” Examples of neighborhood thresholds
for other variables are reviewed in uercia and Galster (2000).
To illustrate a threshold eﬀect, Fig. 6 show the best-response curve for three levels of the tax in
the positive feedback case. e neighborhood begins at the equilibrium p¯0 and with  = 0, for which
p0 ( p¯) is the best-response curve. When the tax rises slightly to 1, the best-response curve falls to p

1 ,
and, over time, the parking ratio falls to p¯1. e result is a somewhat, but not substantially, denser and
morewalkable neighborhood. When the tax rises again to2, the best-response curve shis downward
to p2 ( p¯). Remarkably, even if p

2 ( p¯) is only slightly lower than p

1 ( p¯), the move produces a seismic
change: there is only one equilibrium, at p¯2, and it involves only a fraction as much parking as p¯1.
e reason is that, in moving from p1 ( p¯) to p

2 ( p¯), the upper part of the curve fell below p = p¯ , not
because the tax increase from 1 to 2 was especially large.
3.5.3 Coordination
e above two policies inﬂuence landlords as individuals. It is also possible, in the case of multiple
equilibria, for an authority to directly coordinate all parcels toward a desired equilibrium. e most
straightforward way to do so is to develop a large number of empty parcels, all at once, to achieve an
aggregate parking ratio in the vicinity of a chosen stable equilibrium. Planning movements such as
NewUrbanism could be be thought of as attempts to begin at a walkable equilibrium.
Planners could also attempt to shi an established neighborhood to a new equilibrium by pro-
viding sunspots. is term from macroeconomics refers to “phenomena that do not aﬀect tastes, en-
dowments or production possibilities” but that nonetheless have real eﬀects by synchronizing beliefs
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(Cass and Shell 1983, p. 193). For example, an upbeat government report on the economymay induce
businesses to invest and hire, even when it contains no original news. Businesses invest because they
believe others will do so.
Similarly, municipal policies could act as sunspots, coordinating landlord’s beliefs about the fu-
ture state of the neighborhood. Consider the construction of a streetcar. Even if it fails to provide
a good substitute for car travel, its presence may induce landlords to provide less parking by foster-
ing a general understanding that the neighborhood is headed in a walkable direction. Landlords will
thus provide somewhat less parking in expectation of this state of aﬀairs, and in doing so fulﬁll the
prophecy of a walkable neighborhood. It is not even essential that landlords have faith in the streetcar
as a viable transportation option, only that they believe other landlords associate the streetcar with a
walkable land-use pattern. Of course, a streetcar alone could never shoulder such a large burden, but
the point is that its contribution, as part of a policy package, could be its power as a coordinator of
private expectations.
4 Conclusion
is paper has drawn attention to the possibility of a feedback loop in the provision of oﬀ-street park-
ing for neighborhoods where development is on-going and oﬀ-street parking may substantially alter
urban form. Aer an introduction, Sec. 2 discussed feedback qualitatively, oﬀering ways it could
arise and distinguishing positive from negative feedback. Section 3 set up a stylized economic model
of bundled parking, showed how individuals decide how much parking to provide in the model and
inserted several policies.
e examples given can certainly not be expected to apply everywhere, and the actual process of
neighborhood change rests on considerablymore than the parking supply. Still, if academics and plan-
ners are trying to predict the course of a neighborhood or to explain the course one has already taken,
the feedback potential of the competition betweenparking andﬂoorspace could beworth considering.
Parking is a major part of the cityscape, and developers do not make their decisions about parking in a
vaccum. e examples have tried to make clear, in a concrete way, how the neighborhood’s character
and the small choices that decide it may be inexorably and plausibly tied together.
While the paper has mainly formalized policies, not judged them, the analysis should serve to
sound a note of epistemic caution. Under simple assumptions, policies have been shown to have con-
sequences that are diﬃcult to predict from a survey of static conditions and interests. is point may
be read as favorable to intervention in some cases and hostile in others. Against intervention is the ar-
gument that, though theymay target real externalities like cruising for parking or spillover into private
lots, parking regulations that carry even a slight danger of unwraveling or precluding a good land-use
equilibrium merit scrutiny. In favor of intervention is the argument that past policy failures do not
always foreshadow future results: a policy—such as a parking tax—may have very modest results until
some threshold is breached.
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